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Abstract: Traditionally, theories of mindreading have focused on the representation of 
beliefs and desires. However, decades of social psychology and social neuroscience have 
shown that, in addition to reasoning about beliefs and desires, human beings also use 
representations of character traits to predict and interpret behavior. While a few recent 
accounts have attempted to accommodate these findings, they have not succeeded in 
explaining the relation between trait attribution and belief-desire reasoning. On the account I 
propose, character-trait attribution is part of a hierarchical system for action prediction, and 
serves to inform hypotheses about agents' beliefs and desires, which are in turn used to 
predict and interpret behavior.  
1. Introduction 
As highly social beings, we need to be able to rapidly predict and interpret the behavior of 
those around us in order to thrive. We do this, the usual explanation goes, by reasoning 
about the unobserved representational states that cause behavior – a process variously 
referred to as theory of mind, mindreading, and folk psychology. Standard models of mindreading, 
such as the theory-theory, the simulation theory, and various hybrid models, tend to focus 
especially on how we predict and interpret behaviors in terms of beliefs and desires. This 
focus is epitomized by the field’s longstanding fascination with the false-belief task, which is 
used to measure children’s understanding of the representational nature of belief (Onishi and 
Baillargeon 2005; Rakoczy 2015; Wellman et al. 2001; Wimmer and Perner 1983). As a result, 
questions about the developmental, cognitive, and evolutionary underpinnings of belief-
reasoning tend to dominate social cognition research. 
Due to this narrow focus on beliefs and desires, other conceptual tools that we use to 
interpret behavior are often ignored. One such tool is character-trait attribution: the 
explanation and prediction of behavior in terms of enduring internal properties of 
individuals that lead to stable behavioral tendencies. This omission from the theory-of-mind 
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literature is quite curious: one of the most robust findings in social psychology research is 
that we often interpret behavior on the basis of stable personality traits (D. L. Ames et al. 
2011; Gilbert et al. 1995). Character also figures prominently in moral philosophy 
(Anscombe 1958; Foot 1967; Miller 2013), and has begun to garner attention in empirical 
moral psychology research as well (Sripada 2012; Uhlmann et al. 2015). Yet in spite of its 
presence in neighboring disciplines and a large body of data on the subject, character-trait 
attribution does not figure in classic and contemporary theories of mindreading. 
My goal in this paper is to provide a framework for integrating our understanding of 
character-trait attribution with other aspects of theory of mind. I will propose that we use 
representations of a person’s stable character traits to infer which hypotheses about that 
person’s more transient mental states – namely, their beliefs, goals, and intentions – are more 
probable; we then use these mental-state hypotheses to directly predict their behavior. Trait 
attribution thus forms the upper level of an action-prediction hierarchy, wherein the 
hypotheses at higher levels inform the hypotheses at lower levels. Feedback from observable 
behavior then leads us to make revisions to our mentalistic hypotheses, which might occur at 
either the belief-desire levels or at the level of character traits. This basic inferential structure 
is best understood in terms of a hierarchical Bayesian model of cognition. 
In section 2, I will briefly review part of the empirical literature on the attribution of 
character traits, and the role that these representations play in predicting and interpreting 
behavior. In section 3, I will discuss recent “pluralist” accounts of folk psychological 
reasoning (Andrews 2008, 2012; Fiebich and Coltheart 2015), which do acknowledge the role 
of character-trait attribution in folk psychology, but fail to explain its relationship to other 
forms of mindreading. In sections 4 and 5, I will outline an account in which character-trait 
attribution stands in a systematic, hierarchically structured relation to belief and desire 
attribution. In section 6, I suggest several ways to empirically test this account, as well as 
ways to apply it to other, related domains. 
First, however, a word about how we think of character traits. Like beliefs and desires, 
character traits are believed to be causally related to behavior, and it is not uncommon to 
explain behavior by referring to a character trait (e.g. “She turned in the lost wallet because 
she is an honest person”) (Malle 2004). Some traits, such as selfishness and greed, seem to 
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possess a strong volitional element, and thus seem closely related to desires. Others, such as 
intelligence, cleverness, and gullibility, seem distinctively epistemic, and thus more related to 
beliefs. However, traits also differ from beliefs and desires in several important ways. First, 
beliefs and desires figure in practical reasoning, and lead directly to action. Character traits, 
on the other hand, do not seem to figure in practical reasoning, and it is less clear how they 
translate into particular actions. Second, beliefs and desires can easily change. When we 
acquire new relevant information we regularly change our beliefs; when we successfully act 
out our plans, our desires and goals are fulfilled. Character traits, conversely, are much more 
persistent. They do not update or go away as the result of individual actions, but rather last 
through significant portions of an agent’s lifetime. Third, beliefs and desires can be about 
particular states of affairs. Character traits, on the other hand, relate to the world in a very 
general way, and tend to be relevant across a wide range of situations. In short, character 
traits are temporally stable mental properties that relate to action in an opaque general 
manner across a wide range of situations.1 
Citing evidence from social psychology, some philosophers have questioned whether people 
actually possess character traits as we ordinarily think of them (Doris 2002; Harman 1999). 
These arguments begin with findings showing that subtle manipulations in situational factors 
lead to dramatic effects on behavior. For instance, Isen and Levin showed that finding a 
dime in a phone booth makes people much more likely to help a stranger pick up dropped 
papers – a finding that seems to show that “generosity” is, contrary to common belief, a 
fickle, variable trait (Isen and Levin 1972). Based on these and other experimental results, 
“situationists” have argued that it is situations, and not stable character traits, that really 
cause our behavior. These arguments have sparked a great deal of controversy, and a 
number of philosophers have mounted defenses of the reality of character traits(Miller 2013; 
Sabini and Silver 2005; Sreenivasan 2002).  																																																								1 John Doris offers a similar, though not identical, analysis of character traits. According to his view, “global” 
traits have two primary features:  
1. Consistency. Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behavior across a 
diversity of trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their conduciveness to the 
manifestations of the trait in question. 
2. Stability. Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behavior over iterated 
trials of similar trait-relevant eliciting conditions. (Doris 2002, p. 22)	
Doris also mentions a third feature of character traits, evaluative integration, which is not relevant for our current 
purposes.	
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The situationism debate is about the metaphysical reality of character traits, and whether 
stable character traits ought to figure in mature scientific explanations of behavior; 
situationists think that insofar as character traits exist, they are situation-dependent, and that 
stable character traits have no real explanatory value for psychology. This is not a paper 
about the metaphysical reality of character traits, however. Rather, it is about people’s 
representations of character traits, and the role that these representations play in folk-psychological 
inference. Notoriously, folk reasoning about the world is often inaccurate, and frequently 
invokes entities that do not stand up to scientific scrutiny. For instance, when reasoning 
about the motion of objects, even educated adults seem to rely on a quasi-medieval impetus 
principle, and predict that (for example) a ball spinning around the end of a string will 
continue to follow a curved path when it is released (McCloskey et al. 1980). Impetus 
principles no longer play any role in our mature physics, but they still play a role in folk 
physics. Likewise, stable character traits might have no place in our mature psychology, but 
they clearly still play a role in our folk psychology. Thus, the situationists might be right that 
our behavior is never caused by stable character traits, but they could still allow that 
representations of stable character traits play an important role in our folk psychology. A 
dedicated situationist could thus happily accept the foregoing account as an error theory 
explaining why we think people have stable character traits, even though there are none. The 
two views are, in principle, mutually compatible.  
However, while the present account is not committed to the existence of stable character 
traits as such, it does imply that our representations of character traits have some predictive 
value; otherwise, their prominent role in our cognitive economy would be mysterious. The 
most obvious explanation for this predictive role would be that stable personality traits do in 
fact exist, despite the evidence cited by the situationist. Another explanation would be that 
trait representations serve as a kind of inferential heuristic: even if they fail to track anything 
real in the world, they may earn their predictive keep by conferring some sort of 
information-processing benefit on other socio-cognitive processes (such as belief-desire 
reasoning). Along these lines, I suggest that one function of trait attributions is to provide us 
with initial prior probability distributions over mentalistic hypotheses, which then undergo 
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further updating in response to experience.  Another explanation would be that trait 
representations roughly track something in the world – just not character traits. Like the 
impetus principle, which roughly tracks the real physical principle of inertia (but 
systematically errs in certain cases), it may be that our trait representations roughly 
correspond to some predictively relevant property of the social environment, which we 
systematically misrepresent as stable character-traits. In this vein, I suggest in section 6 that our 
trait attributions may sometimes track relational social properties such as status and 
intergroup threat. 
In order for my account to be right, at least one of these explanations must be correct. It 
could be that all of them are right: perhaps our trait attributions sometimes track real 
personality traits, while also tracking relational social properties, while simultaneously 
conferring an information-processing benefit on our overall action-predictions. However, I 
need not take a strong stand on this issue at this time. All that matters for my current 
purposes is the role that trait information plays in the structure of mentalistic action-
prediction. 
2. Impression formation and mindreading  
In social psychology and socio-cognitive neuroscience, reasoning about character traits is 
most often referred to as ‘impression formation’ and ‘person perception’ (D. L. Ames et al. 
2011; Trope and Gaunt 2007). While we attribute a wide range of specific traits to others, it 
appears that the kinds of traits we appeal to tend to be organized along two particular social 
dimensions: warmth and competence (Fiske et al. 2007). The warmth dimension captures 
attributions of traits such as friendliness, sincerity, trustworthiness, and seems to track 
whether we expect an individual to be positively or negatively disposed towards us. The 
competence dimension, in contrast, captures attributions of traits such as intelligence, 
impulsivity, and social dominance, and seems to track our estimation of an individual’s 
ability to successfully achieve their goals. When trait attributions are analyzed in terms of 
these two dimensions, they are highly predictive of our reactive attitudes towards both 
individuals and groups (Cuddy et al. 2007), even across a wide range of cultures (Cuddy et al. 
2009).  
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Interestingly, these two trait dimensions do not just emerge in people’s judgments of 
individuals: they also emerge in stereotypes about social groups. For instance, common anti-
Semitic stereotypes tend to invoke low warmth traits, such as deceptiveness and miserliness, 
but also high competence traits, such as intelligence. Misogynistic stereotypes, in contrast, 
invoke high warmth traits, such as helpfulness, but also low-competence traits, such as 
frivolity and superficiality. Stereotypes about very low status groups, such as the homeless, 
tend to contain low competence traits, such as stupidity and laziness, and low warmth traits, 
such as dishonesty. Both social in-groups (e.g. students if one is a student) and societal 
prototype groups (in Western cultures, the White middle class) tend to be rated as both high 
competence and high warmth (Cuddy et al. 2009; Fiske 2015; Fiske et al. 2007). This 
suggests that we may use a person’s social group membership as a source of evidence about 
her character traits (see also Fiebich and Coltheart (2015)).  
Many of the methods used to study trait attributions involve explicit, linguistically based 
measures (e.g. Ross 1977); however, character-trait attributions can also be extremely rapid 
and unconscious. In particular, we seem to use low-level perceptual cues such as facial 
appearance to make character-trait attributions within 100 milliseconds of encountering 
someone (Bar et al. 2006; Todorov 2013). Incredibly, these rapid, perceptually based trait 
attributions also vary along the dimensions of warmth and competence (or, as they are 
referred to in this literature, trustworthiness and dominance). In particular, neutral-
expression faces with wider jaws, heavier brows, and smaller eyes tend to be judged as more 
dominant, while “baby faces” tend to be judged as less dominant; similarly, neutral-
expression faces with downturned brows and lips tend to be judged as less trustworthy, 
while faces with high brows and upturned lips tend to be judged as more trustworthy 
(Todorov et al. 2008). Thus, from the first second that we encounter someone, we begin to 
form a representation of his or her character traits along the warmth and competence 
dimensions. 
Of course, we do not infer personality traits from appearance alone: we also use a person’s 
behavior and second-hand information to inform our representations of their character. The 
most well-known finding in this vein is that we tend to over-attribute the causes of behavior 
to underlying traits or dispositions rather than situational factors – a phenomenon known as 
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the ‘correspondence bias’ or the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Gawronski 2004; Gilbert et 
al. 1995; E. Jones and Harris 1967; Ross 1977). For instance, when participants passively 
observe one confederate quizzing another, they tend to rate the questioner as more 
intelligent than the test-taker, even though the questioner has clearly been provided with the 
answers, while the test-taker has not (Ross 1977). This bias can be mitigated by prompting 
participants to explicitly attend to situational factors (e.g. that the questioner has been 
provided with all the answers, whereas the test-taker has not); however, participants will 
default to the correspondence bias when placed under cognitive load, even if the very same 
situational information is made explicitly available (Gilbert et al. 1988, 1995). This suggests 
that the correspondence bias is the product of a relatively efficient cognitive process, while 
correcting it requires cognitive control.2 
Much of the research on the correspondence bias has occurred separately from research on 
mindreading, focusing instead on the distinction between situation-based and disposition-
based explanations of behavior. But some social psychologists have begun to explore the 
connection between representations of traits and other mental states, such as intentions. For 
instance, Krull and colleagues found that participants were less likely to exhibit a 
correspondence bias when an actor performed a helpful action if the actor showed signs of 
unwillingness (Krull et al. 2008). Likewise, a number of authors have found that the 
correspondence bias was attenuated when participants were given reason to think that a 
given action may have been performed for an ulterior motive (D. R. Ames et al. 2004; Fein 
1996; Reeder et al. 2004). Hooper and colleagues also found that participants who were 
primed to engage in explicit perspective-taking displayed a diminished correspondence bias 
compared to a control group (Hooper et al. 2015). Thus, thinking about mental states seems 
to mediate inferences from behavior to character (Reeder 2009). 
																																																								
2 There are also cross-cultural differences in the extent to which individuals fall prey to the correspondence 
bias. While the correspondence bias is present to some extent across cultures (Choi et al. 1999; Krull et al. 
1999; Norenzayan et al. 2003), it appears that members of "individualist" societies are particularly susceptible to 
it; meanwhile, members of "collectivist" societies seem to pay more attention to situational factors and the 
presence of social constraints (Choi and Nisbett 1998; Miyamoto and Kitayama 2002). This is consistent with 
the broad finding that members of collectivist cultures display a habitual tendency to attend to situational 
factors and contexts (Kitayama et al. 2003). These habitual patterns of attention seem to make members of 
"collectivist" cultures better able to correct their initial dispositionalist attributions.	
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This relationship between trait attribution and other forms of mental-state attribution is 
reflected in the neural correlates of both processes, which overlap substantially and appear to 
be functionally related. Many neuroimaging studies have confirmed the existence of a 
distinctive network of brain regions that are consistently recruited when we reason about the 
thoughts and behavior of others: the temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), the posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (pSTS), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the precuneus (PC), and the 
temporal poles (TP) (Van Overwalle 2009). All of these regions are implicated in impression 
formation and updating, both under intentional and spontaneous conditions (Cloutier et al. 
2011; Ferrari et al. 2016; Harris et al. 2005; Hassabis et al. 2013; Kestemont et al. 2013; Ma et 
al. 2011). The dorsal region of the mPFC (dmPFC) in particular seems to be centrally 
implicated in the representation of stable personality traits (Ferrari et al. 2016; Ma et al. 
2012). When subjects are explicitly prompted to reason about traits, this region is highly 
active; in contrast, when subjects are prompted to reason about “situational” factors, this 
region is less active, while regions associated with goal and belief attribution, such as the TPJ 
and the pSTS, are more so (Kestemont et al. 2013). However, when subjects learn that a 
person holds a belief or performs an intentional action that is inconsistent with a previously 
formed impression, both the TPJ and the dmPFC show increased activity (Cloutier et al. 
2011; Ma et al. 2011). Thus, the neuroimaging data, like the behavioral data, suggest that 
mental state information interacts with the trait attribution process.   
There is also some indication that representations of character traits can bias our mental-
state attributions. This evidence comes from a debate about how to interpret the side-effect 
effect, which is when participants seem to over-attribute intentionality and blame to agents 
whose actions have negative (but not positive) side-effects (Knobe 2003). Chandra Sripada 
has suggested that this effect may be driven by an initial negative judgment of the agent’s 
character, or “Deep Self” (Sripada 2009). According to this view, participants incorrectly 
judge that the agent intentionally caused a particular outcome because this intentionality 
attribution seems to follow from their previous impression of the agent’s character; in other 
words, they interpret the agent’s actions (and their consequences) as flowing from their 
deeper personality traits. To test this theory, Sripada asked participants who had completed a 
side-effect effect task to give an explicit evaluation of the agent’s character and core values; 
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sure enough, these predicted their intentionality judgments (Sripada and Konrath 2011; 
Sripada 2012).  
To summarize: upon first encountering an individual, we rapidly construct a representation 
of their character that is especially sensitive to particular trait-dimensions, namely warmth 
and competence. We use various sources of information to update this representation, and 
are biased towards interpreting behavior as reflecting stable character traits. However, these 
inferences are mediated by inferences about mental states: when information about the 
motivations and beliefs of others is available, we update or refrain from updating our 
character models accordingly. Moreover, background knowledge about character also seems 
to affect our intentionality attributions, suggesting that we expect not just behavior, but also 
intentions to accord with character. Inferences about character and inferences about mental 
states, in short, appear to inform one another.  
3. Character-trait attribution and theories of folk psychology 
Traditional accounts of mindreading, such as the simulation theory and the theory-theory, 
have not typically addressed how we attribute character traits. The notion of character seems 
particularly hard to integrate into a simulation-based account. According to the simulation 
theory, if an interpreter has enough information about another agent’s beliefs and desires, 
she can make a successful behavioral prediction by simulating in an offline manner how she 
would behave if she had those same beliefs and desires (Goldman 2006; Heal 1996). But it is 
not at all clear how this strategy could extend to trait attribution. Character traits are not the 
sorts of things that could figure in practical reasoning.3 Any effect of character on practical 
reasoning is bound to be oblique: it may affect the kinds of beliefs and desires we form in 
the first place, the extent to which we deliberate before acting, or the relative importance 
that we assign to particular desires. Thus, it is not clear where – if anywhere – character traits 
could fit into a pure simulationist account. 
																																																								3 Beliefs about one’s own character traits could figure in practical reasoning. But this observation is of little 
help to the simulation-theorist: surely, this kind of self-reflection is uncommon in the first-person case, and it 
would be bizarre if we nevertheless believed that other people frequently engage in it. Moreover, beliefs about 
one’s character seem like they would have a very different effect on behavior than character itself. If I reflect 
on my own impulsivity, for instance it will probably lead me to be less impulsive.  
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The only plausible option for the simulation theorist would be to endorse a hybrid account. 
Instead of holding that character enters into the simulation process itself, a hybrid 
simulation/theory-theorist could hold that character information is used to infer the inputs to 
the simulation procedure. This solves the simulationist’s character problem, but only at the 
cost of conceding that simulation theory is poorly equipped for reasoning about traits. It also 
raises a new question: how would a theory-theorist explain the effects of character on 
practical reasoning? 
Fortunately, the theory-theory seems better equipped to deal with trait attribution. 
Traditional theory-theory accounts focus on generalizations about how beliefs and desires 
combine to produce behavior, treating both as underlying causal variables (Gopnik and 
Wellman 2012; Wellman 2014). Quite conceivably, character traits could be treated as 
another kind of underlying variable, albeit one that has a much less direct effect on behavior 
than beliefs and desires. But any such account would need to do more than just posit an 
additional variable: it would also have to tell us just how traits relate to mental states, and 
how they help us to predict behavior. The account that I propose in this paper, which could 
be construed as a version of the theory-theory, will attempt to do just this. 
There is, however, one group of mindreading theorists that has already explicitly addressed 
the role of character-trait attribution in action prediction and interpretation: the folk-
psychology pluralists (Andrews 2008, 2012; Fiebich and Coltheart 2015). The basic goal of 
the pluralists is to offer an alternative to simulation theory and theory-theory accounts that 
invokes a broader set of procedures and representations. Andrews (2008, 2012) suggests that 
in addition to belief-desire reasoning, we also use social norms, stereotypes, situation-based 
schemas, and trait attribution to predict and explain behavior. Likewise, Fiebich and 
Coltheart (2015) propose that we use trait-based inferences to predict and interpret behavior, 
in addition to theory-based and simulation-based procedures. They also situate these various 
socio-cognitive strategies within a two-systems framework4 (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; 
Kahneman 2011). Thus, when predicting and interpreting another agent’s behavior, we may 
use either System 1 or System 2 versions of simulation, theory, or trait attribution.  																																																								4 System 1 strategies are “fast, relatively effortless routines that occur without our awareness,” while System 2 
strategies are “slow routines which require the expenditure of mental effort and are subject to consciousness 
and deliberative control” (Fiebich and Coltheart 2015, p. 238). 
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While they differ in several respects, these pluralist accounts treat reasoning about behavior 
in terms of character traits as a socio-cognitive alternative to belief-desire predictions and 
explanations. Even if an agent did not possess the concepts of BELIEF and DESIRE, 
according to the pluralists, they might still successfully predict behavior by using their 
knowledge of a target's traits. This is possible, the pluralists argue, because trait-based 
interpretations rely on associations between behaviors and situations. For instance, a trait 
like generosity might form the central node5 in a network of behavior-situation pairings: 
leaving large tips and restaurants, carrying heavy boxes and friends moving house, and so on. These 
associative networks would enable agents to attribute traits whenever an individual 
demonstrated one of the relevant behavior-situation pairings, and then use this information 
to predict that individual's behavior in other situations in which generosity might be possible.  
While the pluralists should be given due credit for emphasizing a role for traits in our folk 
psychology, this particular approach to trait attribution has two important limitations. The 
first is that the predictive utility of trait-based reasoning will depend heavily on how 
‘situations’ get represented. If trait-behavior associations are tied only to situations that we 
have previously experienced, then it will be inert whenever we encounter a novel situation. 
Andrews (2008) recognizes this fact, but suggests that it is not a big problem, because we 
spend most of our time in relatively familiar situations. But this reply raises an important 
question: how do we parse situations for the purpose of trait-based predictions? If we parse 
situations at a fairly coarse level, then Andrews might be right; however, this would make the 
corresponding predictions far less reliable, since they would be insensitive to important 
situational differences. For instance, if one forms the association between leaving large tips and 
restaurants, then we would predict that a generous person would leave a large tip even when 																																																								5 Fiebich & Coltheart distinguish between non-linguistic trait attributions and linguistic trait attributions. Non-
linguistic trait attributions occur when an agent does not possess a linguistic concept of a trait (i.e. the word 
'generosity'). These only consist in associations between particular behaviors, situations, and agents, and would 
only allow for predicting similar behaviors in similar situations. Linguistic trait attributions, in contrast, involve 
the possession of a linguistic concept of a trait, and would facilitate a whole network of predictions.  
I am skeptical of this distinction for two reasons. First, non-linguistic trait attribution, on this account, does not 
seem to involve trait-based reasoning at all: traits are supposed to be enduring, internal properties of 
individuals, but these non-linguistic trait attributions seem to consist only in superficial behavioral associations. 
Second, this distinction implicitly assumes that the only way to possess a concept of a trait is through language. 
But there is ample reason to think that even pre-linguistic or non-linguistic entities can possess concepts (e.g. 
Call and Tomasello 2008; Carey 2009). While linguistic concepts undoubtedly enrich and expand our trait 
attribution abilities, there is no reason to think that non-linguistic trait attribution is as impoverished as Fiebich 
and Coltheart (2015) make it out to be.	
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she has received poor service, or when a friend is treating her. Conversely, if situations are 
parsed very finely, then we will treat otherwise familiar situations as novel, given a very slight 
change. Thus, we might expect a generous person to leave large tips in sushi restaurants with 
good lighting, but not in sushi restaurants with bad lighting. In this case, most trait attributions 
would be predictively inert. Unless we parse situations just right, in other words, the pluralist 
strategy will either lead to inaccurate overgeneralizations, or inflexible under-generalizations. 
Some pluralists may simply wish to concede the limited reliability of trait attributions. 
Andrews (2008) suggests that when we make inaccurate predictions, we may simply respond 
by forgetting them, or by giving a post-hoc explanation of our failures, and then carry on 
with our business. This is not a problem, the pluralist argues, because we have lots of 
different strategies for folk-psychological prediction: when trait attribution fails us, we may 
simply try a different one. This response is unsatisfying: even if trait-based reasoning is often 
inaccurate, it seems that one should be able to learn from these inaccuracies in order to 
inform future predictions, rather than simply discard them. Indeed, the evidence reviewed in 
the previous section indicates that we actually pay close attention when our trait-based 
expectations are violated. But if traits were truly an unreliable way to predict behavior, then 
why would we continue to track character information? If the pluralist story about trait 
attribution is correct, then this seems like a bizarre use of limited cognitive resources. 
The second, related limitation of the pluralist account of character traits is that it cannot 
explain the empirical relation between trait attribution and mental-state attribution. As we 
saw in the previous section, these two forms of reasoning seem to be causally interrelated, 
both at the behavioral and neural levels. But on the pluralist account of trait reasoning, 
mental state information is never involved. This is by design: the pluralist's goal is to show 
that behavioral prediction and interpretation can happen in the absence of mental-state 
attribution. Indeed, Andrews (2008) argues that there is really a double dissociation between 
belief-attribution and trait-based reasoning. First, while children are able to reason explicitly 
about beliefs from an early age, they do not explicitly mention traits in their explanations and 
predictions of behavior until much later (Kalish 2002). Thus, it is possible to reason about 
mental states even if one cannot reason about character traits. Second, interventions for 
children with autism (who lack the ability to reason about beliefs) often rely upon training 
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children to associate traits and behaviors, such as the term ‘happy’ with smiling and laughing 
(Gray 2007). Thus, one can also reason about traits without being able to reason about 
mental states. 
There are a few problems with this argument. First, there is now positive evidence that three 
to four year-old children respond in an adult-like manner to facial features associated with 
warmth and competence, despite the fact that they do not refer to such traits in their 
explanations of behavior (Cogsdill et al. 2014). Second, the autism intervention Andrews 
describes does not seem to be about trait-reasoning at all, but rather reasoning about 
emotions. But even if it were an instance of trait-reasoning, this would then be an exception 
that proves the rule: in the absence of the capacity to reason about beliefs, it seems that 
children with autism are only able to use trait information through explicit laborious training, 
whereas it comes naturally to neurotypical individuals.  
However, even if we were to accept Andrews’ double dissociation argument in its entirety, 
all it would show is that character reasoning and belief-desire reasoning are not identical, and 
that neither is necessary for the other. But these are only the strongest possible relations that 
could hold between these two processes. Even if, in principle, there could be double 
dissociations between character reasoning and belief-desire reasoning, it might still be true 
that the two processes are causally and functionally intertwined. 
I suggest that the solution to the pluralist’s first problem may lie in developing an answer to 
the second. What the pluralist proposal lacks is a principled basis for parsing situations for 
the purpose of behavioral prediction. But if we consider an agent’s beliefs and desires, the 
solution to this problem is obvious: the ‘situation’ will consist in those features of the local 
context that the agent believes are relevant to her goals. Moreover, this approach would 
facilitate predictions even in highly unfamiliar situations. This is because mental-state 
reasoning is a highly flexible, generative framework for predicting and interpreting behavior. 
By employing causal models that treat mental states as variables that can take on a broad 
range of values, mentalistic reasoning is capable of generating behavioral predictions about 
an indefinitely large number of novel situations, even if they have yet to be encountered 
(Christensen and Michael 2015). Thus, the predictive link between traits and behaviors 
postulated by pluralists only makes sense when it is mediated by belief-desire reasoning, 
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because belief-desire reasoning provides us with a principled basis for parsing situations. 
However, this leaves us with the same lingering question that we started with: how are trait 
representations related to representations of beliefs and desires?   
4. The action prediction hierarchy 
In this section, I introduce hierarchical predictive coding accounts of cognition, and how 
they have been applied to theory of mind research. This will lay the groundwork for my 
positive account of how representations of character relate to belief-desire reasoning. I begin 
with a brief digression about the nature of mirror neurons. The purpose of this digression 
will be to illustrate how predictive-coding approaches are poised to explain the cognitive 
underpinnings of action prediction. In particular, these accounts posit that we represent 
intentional states in a hierarchical fashion, and that mirror-neuron activity reflects the way 
we exploit this hierarchy when predicting intentional actions. Ultimately, I will argue that our 
representations of character are a part of this action-prediction hierarchy.  
4.1. Mirror neurons and act ion hierarchies 
Mental states vary with respect to their temporal stability. For instance, some desire-like 
states, such as motor intentions – the intention to make a particular bodily movement, such 
as reaching or grasping – are highly transient. We also chain together many individual motor 
intentions in order in order to fulfill particular action-goals, as when we walk across a room 
to pick up a tool; these goals last longer than the individual motor intentions that comprise 
them, but are still extinguished relatively quickly. Many of these action-goals can be chained 
together to achieve more complex, temporally extended goals, such as building a house or 
fixing a car. These broader goals can in turn serve as sub-goals for still larger projects, and so 
on. Desire-like states, in other words, seem to form temporal hierarchies: more stable goals 
are comprised of more transient sub-goals, which are comprised of even more transient sub-
sub-goals, eventually bottoming out in very low-level motor plans. 
This property of desire-like states has not gone unnoticed by mindreading theorists. In 
particular, it has caught the attention of several authors who were unsatisfied with the 
standard, “direct-mapping” interpretation of mirror-neuron activity endorsed by simulation 
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theorists (Gallese and Goldman 1998). According to this standard interpretation, when we 
observe the low-level visual properties of another agent’s movements, we automatically form 
an offline representation of those actions in the pre-motor cortex, where we normally 
represent our own action plans. Based on this representation, the story goes, we are then 
able to deduce the higher-order intentions that would have caused this action plan, and 
thereby infer the agent’s goals, effectively using our own motor planning system in reverse 
(Jeannerod et al. 1995; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004).  
There is a big problem with this account: the inference from low-level visual properties of 
behavior to goals is vastly under-determined. This is because a single behavior is, in 
principle, compatible with a wide range of underlying motivations. One could, for instance, 
raise one’s hand with an open palm because one is about to salute, to give a high five, to 
wave in greeting, to tell someone to stop, or to deliver a slap. The same behavioral effect, in 
other words, could have indefinitely many different mental causes (a predicament known as 
an ‘inverse problem’) (Csibra 2008; Jacob and Jeannerod 2005; Kilner et al. 2007). This 
means that for any given behavior that the mirror neuron system represents, we must sort 
through an indeterminately large space of possible goals that might have caused it. Thus, the 
direct-mapping account quickly leads to computational intractability.  
This observation has led several authors to argue that mirror-neuron activity does not reflect 
a bottom-up mapping from motor-intentions to goals, but rather a top-down prediction 
about an agent’s likely behaviors based on a prior hypothesis about its goals – what Csibra 
(2008) calls the ‘predictive action monitoring hypothesis’. This solves the aforementioned 
under-determination problem, because all it involves is checking whether an observed 
behavior would be made likely given a hypothesized goal, rather than solving for a unique goal 
from an ambiguous behavior. And since goals are a more abstract kind of representation 
than motor intentions, they tend to be consistent with a fairly wide range of more concrete 
physical behaviors. For instance, the goal of eating an apple makes a number of behaviors 
more likely: reaching over to grab the apple and bringing it to one’s mouth, or reaching over 
to grab an apple and then grabbing a knife to peel it, or using the knife to cut it into wedges, 
etc. Our action-prediction system solves this problem by selecting the behaviors that are 
most probable given the goal in question. The computational dilemma faced by the direct-
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mapping account is thus avoided by taking a top-down, predictive approach that exploits the 
hierarchical structure of goal-directed action. 
The predictive action-monitoring hypothesis also seems to be more consistent with the 
existing mirror-neuron data: Gallese and Goldman found that monkeys’ mirror neurons 
show no activity for mimicked actions, as when an experimenter pretends to grasp a non-
existent object (Gallese and Goldman 1998). Umiltà and colleagues also found that 
monkeys’ mirror neurons do respond to actions where low-level visual input is 
unavailable, as when they watch an experimenter reach behind an occluder to grasp a 
hidden piece of food (Umiltà et al. 2001). In humans, motor-priming (an effect of mirror 
neuron activity) seems to be sensitive to background knowledge about the intentional status 
of an bodily movement: if participants believe that a movement is forced, rather than goal-
directed, no motor priming occurs (Liepelt and Brass 2010; Liepelt and Cramon 2008). Thus 
it seems that mirror neurons are responsive to expectations about goal-directed action, rather 
than the low-level visual properties of action.  
4.2. Hierarchical  Predic t ive  Coding and theory o f  mind 
The predictive action-monitoring hypothesis reflects a growing trend in cognitive science 
and neuroscience towards predictive models of cognition (Clark 2015; Seligman et al. 2013). 
The brain, in a very general sense, needs to be in the business of making predictions about 
the world: without being able to predict what’s coming next, planning one’s future actions is 
impossible. These predictions need to happen at multiple timescales simultaneously, whether 
we are predicting the objects in the space before us as we move through it, predicting where 
to find food in our local environment, or predicting events in the distant future. Predicting 
the behavior of other agents, in this sense, is just one part of the larger cognitive challenge of 
planning one’s actions. As creatures that engage in complex forms of social coordination, 
this kind of prediction is especially important for human beings. The predictive action-
monitoring hypothesis thus accounts for a key aspect how human beings are able to form 
plans at multiple timescales in a highly social environment.  
Hierarchical predictive coding theories (HPC) have proven a fruitful way to translate this 
broad insight about the importance of prediction in cognition to specific hypotheses about 
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neural processing. According to HPC theorists, our expectations about the environment 
begin on the shortest possible timescale, with predictions about the causes of our present 
sensory experiences. On this view, neural systems do not just respond to incoming 
environmental information in a bottom-up manner, but also make forward-looking 
predictions about what that information will be, which they pass down the cortical hierarchy 
to the relevant input systems. Incoming information is then checked against the prediction 
signal; if the two do not match, an error signal is propagated back up the hierarchy, and 
checked against the higher order prediction. If these error signals are large, then the 
information they carry is incorporated into a revised internal model of the causal structure of 
the world, which then generates new predictions about incoming information. This process 
then repeats itself iteratively until prediction error signals are minimized. Formally, this 
account is said to be equivalent to a Bayesian updating procedure, wherein the posterior 
probability of a given hypothesis is a function of the prior probability of that hypothesis and 
the probability of a given observation (Bar 2007; Clark 2015; Friston and Kiebel 2009; 
Hohwy 2013; Spratling 2008).6  
Building on initial applications of the HPC framework to mirror neurons (Kilner et al. 2007), 
a number of authors have now proposed HPC accounts of mindreading (de Bruin and 
Strijbos 2015; Hohwy and Palmer 2014; Koster-Hale and Saxe 2013). The most detailed of 
these proposals to date is that of Koster-Hale and Saxe (2013). Reviewing a wide range of 
neuroscientific evidence, they argue that much of the neural activity during mindreading 
tasks displays the signature of a predictive-coding architecture – namely, greater responsivity 
to unexpected stimuli than expected stimuli (i.e. prediction error signals). For example, they 
describe how the STS, which is associated with the processing of biological motion and goal-
directed action, displays enhanced responses to unexpected behaviors, either because they 
are inefficient (Brass et al. 2007; Deen and Saxe 2012) or inconsistent with previously 
displayed desires (Jastorff et al. 2011). Likewise, the TPJ, which is known to respond to 
information about beliefs (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003), displays a stronger response to belief 																																																								
6 There is considerable variation amongst the different versions of predictive coding. Some theorists have taken 
the extreme position that prediction error signals are the only information carried via bottom-up input systems 
(Clark 2015; Friston and Kiebel 2009; Hohwy 2013), while others allow that traditional bottom-up information-
processing compliments top-down prediction (Bar 2007; Spratling 2016). On my account, trait information 
(e.g. via facial features) is sometimes initially processed in a bottom-up fashion; as such, I disavow the idea that 
bottom-up input systems only carry prediction errors.  
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ascriptions that are surprising than those that are expected, given one’s background beliefs 
about an individual (Cloutier et al. 2011; Saxe and Wexler 2005).  
Koster-Hale and Saxe also argue that the data on trait-sensitive activity in the dmPFC is also 
consistent with a prediction-error minimization account. For instance, after Ma and 
colleagues provided participants with verbal information about the behavior of an individual 
(from which various character traits could be inferred), they presented them with test 
sentences that were either consistent or inconsistent with these descriptions (e.g. “Tolvan 
gave her brother a hug” versus “Tolvan gave her brother a slap”). They saw increased 
responsivity in the dmPFC for trait-inconsistent behaviors (Ma et al., 2011; see also Behrens, 
Hunt, & Rushworth, 2009; Kestemont et al., 2013; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013). 
Thus, the dmPFC seems to be sensitive to prediction errors related to personality traits. 
Currently, the HPC approach to theory of mind is still in its infancy. As Koster-Hale and 
Saxe note, more empirical work needs to be done to develop the positive predictions of this 
kind of account in detail. However, HPC gives mindreading theorists a well-supported, 
general empirical framework for explaining the nature of action-prediction that has already 
been fruitfully applied to a number of different cognitive domains. It also coheres with a 
broader consensus among cognitive scientists about the centrality of predictive processes in 
cognitive systems. Although it is not without its controversies7, the HPC approach in general 
is currently a progressive scientific research program (Lakatos 1970), and a promising way to 
pursue questions about the nature of social cognition. In the next section, I use this 
approach to develop an empirically supported conjecture about the relationship between 
character-trait attribution and other forms of mindreading. 
																																																								
7 For example, the explanatory status of the Bayesian aspect of these models is a vexed question. Some 
theorists are explicit that the Bayesian formalism is intended to capture only the computational level of 
description, abstracted away from implementational, mechanistic details (Chater et al. 2006), while others seem 
to be making claims about the actual algorithms that support predictive processes (Friston and Kiebel 2009). 
While some have charged that ultimately, Bayesian models amount to “just-so” stories with little explanatory 
value (M. Jones and Love 2011), there are reasonable answers to such challenges (Zednik and Jäkel 2016), and 
plausible ways to interpret the various aspects of Bayesian models that render them empirically tractable (Icard 
2016). 	
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5. Character and the action-prediction hierarchy 
Within a hierarchical Bayesian framework, a possible relationship between character traits 
and other mental states starts to emerge. As we saw initially with the case of mirror neurons, 
predictions about more transient states of affairs, such as motor intentions, tend to be 
informed by hypotheses about more temporally stable goal states. Hypotheses about goals, 
in turn, are informed by representations of more enduring desires. At each subordinate level 
in the predictive hierarchy, expectations about more transient states are shaped by 
superordinate hypotheses about more enduring states. As I discussed in the introduction, a 
key feature of character traits that distinguishes them from beliefs and desires is their greater 
temporal stability. As such, traits seem to fit naturally into the upper levels of the hierarchy 
for action-prediction. Background beliefs about character traits could thus inform and 
constrain predictions about more transient mental states, which then inform predictions 
about observable behavior.  
To illustrate: suppose that you are observing Tom, whom you believe to be dishonest. A 
woman walks past, and accidentally drops her wallet in front of him. Tom looks toward the 
wallet, and then looks back at the woman. Because you know him to be dishonest, you 
assign a high probability to the hypothesis that Tom desires to steal the wallet. Given this 
desire-attribution, you might then expect that Tom will perform a series of actions: look 
around to see if anyone is watching, bend over discretely by the wallet as if tying his shoe, 
pick up the wallet and put it in his pocket. The prior trait attribution – dishonesty – thus 
serves as an over-hypothesis, raising the prior probability of mental-state hypotheses that are 
consistent with the trait in question – namely, self-interested desires (Kemp et al. 2007).8 
Thus, when we observe Tom’s actions in a particular scenario, the first desire-hypotheses 
that we are liable to make will be based on this prior probability distribution. If we predict 
that Tom will form some particular self-interested desire, this will then raise the probability 
																																																								8	This is one way in which character traits may serve as an inferential heuristic: without this over-hypothesis, 
mindreaders would begin their action-predictions with a flat probability distribution over all the mental state 
hypotheses consistent with their current behavioral observations, which would give rise to an inverse problem. 
Instead, trait attributions bias the prior probability distribution towards a subset of mental-state hypotheses, 
which the predictor can proceed to test. Even if this distribution is in fact erroneous, it still serves as a means 
of bootstrapping our initial mental-state predictions, which then allow us to update our priors accordingly.		
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of certain hypotheses about Tom’s actions. Trait-attribution thus has a cascading effect on 
the kinds of mental-states that we attribute, and ultimately on action-prediction.  
How we predict that Tom will act on this initial desire-attribution will also be affected by 
other psychological and situational factors besides Tom’s character. For instance, if there are 
people watching him, we may predict that when Tom looks around, he will refrain from 
further action. Likewise, if he sees the woman suddenly turn back, we might predict that he 
will form a new plan: to act as though he were intent on returning the wallet all along, and 
hand it back to her. Thus, the effects of trait-attributions on specific action-predictions are 
likely to be moderated by actively updating belief-attribution procedures that respond to  
immediate situational factors (Kovács 2015). Importantly, this shows that knowing both 1) 
that Tom is dishonest, and 2) that someone has dropped a wallet in front of him does not 
lead to any particular behavioral prediction. Rather, action predictions are produced via an 
initial trait attribution followed by a series of mental-state inferences at lower levels in the 
hierarchy.   
Notably, if we antecedently believed that Tom were an honest person, then we might 
attribute to him the desire to return the wallet to its original owner. Ironically, this might 
generate a similar series of predicted behaviors as in our original prediction: looking around, 
reaching down to pick up the wallet, and then giving it back to the woman when she returns, 
or else pocketing it in order to bring it to the police later. Given two opposite trait 
attributions in the same situation, there might be no difference whatsoever in the actual 
behaviors initially predicted; all that would differ would be the kinds of intervening mental 
states that we ascribe to Tom. Within the pluralists’ association-based model, we could never 
capture this difference. But on a hierarchical predictive model where traits inform mental-
state attributions, which in turn inform predictions about behavior, we can. 
One might object that these toy examples only really shows that character traits help us to 
predict desires, but that they don’t seem to help us predict beliefs. But there are several ways 
in which trait attributions might make belief-hypotheses more probable. Traits relating to 
epistemic agency, such as gullibility or suspiciousness, will affect the priors we assign to 
hypotheses about beliefs formed on the basis of testimony, for example. Other traits may 
lead to predictions about how ambiguous situations will be interpreted: we may infer that a 
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paranoid individual will interpret two people whispering one way, an easygoing person 
another. And even when traits only lead to desire attributions, these might generate 
expectations about how a person will allocate their attention, which would in turn result in 
new perceptual beliefs, as when Tom saw the wallet, and then looked around to see if he was 
being watched. 
This hierarchical, predictive approach to trait attribution also helps us make sense of some of 
the empirical data on trait attribution described in section 2. For instance, if trait attribution 
is higher up in the action-prediction hierarchy, and has a cascading effect on lower-order 
mentalistic and behavioral predictions, then we should expect that upon encountering 
someone new, trait attribution should be prioritized. The more quickly we start to construct 
a model of a person’s character, the faster we will be able to use that information to predict 
and interpret their behavior. This means that within milliseconds of encountering someone, 
we need to start to gather whatever information is available to build up a representation of 
their stable character traits. Facial structure is well-suited for this purpose, because it can be 
processed extremely rapidly as coarse-grained, low spatial frequency information (Bar et al. 
2006). This kind of input can be used for an initial conceptual categorization of a stimulus, 
which can then be used to generate predictions about subsequent input (Bar 2007; Chaumon 
et al. 2014). In other words, we can use facial information to form our first impressions of a 
person’s character, which can then inform our subsequent expectations about intentional 
behavior.  
Of course, initial trait attributions based on faces are neither accurate nor particularly 
informative for predictive purposes. But in a HPC framework, this is not a problem: learning 
from mistakes is what Bayesian systems do best. If an initial model results in a prediction 
error, this information can be used to update the model accordingly. For instance, if one 
encounters a person with a facial structure associated with trustworthiness, one might 
initially expect her to be generally well intentioned. However, if one witnessed such a person 
do something obviously cruel (e.g. abusing an animal), one would of course update one’s 
model of that person’s character (Mende-Siedlecki et al. 2013; Tannenbaum et al. 2011). As 
we accumulate new information about a person’s behavior, we may iteratively revise our 
initial model of their character, leading to increased accuracy (Cunningham et al. 2007). This 
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helps to resolve one of the major puzzles of the pluralist account: even if trait attributions 
are initially unreliable, they might still serve as a basis for social learning and prediction, 
leading to increasingly accurate models of a person's character. 
This complementary prioritization and updating of trait information can also shed light on 
the cognitive processing underlying the fundamental attribution error. Most impression-
formation tasks that lead to the fundamental attribution error introduce participants to new 
people. If constructing a character model is prioritized by the mindreading system, then we 
should expect interpreters to use whatever behavioral information is available to construct 
that model as fast as possible. But when our attention is drawn to mitigating situational 
factors, our initial personality models are updated, and the behavioral evidence is discounted 
(Gilbert et al. 1988).9 Likewise, when we are provided with additional mental state 
information (Krull et al. 2008; Reeder et al. 2004), or primed to think about mental states 
(Hooper et al. 2015), we use that information to update our character models accordingly. 
However, in a HPC framework, not all prediction errors lead to updating. The world, after 
all, is messy and complex. Even a highly accurate causal model is liable to make mistakes. 
Many of these mistakes will be due to noise in the input, rather than a problem with the 
model. Updating the model to accommodate every piece of information it encounters would 
result in overfitting, and thus diminish its overall predictive accuracy (Hohwy 2013). 
Moreover, updating the model is likely to be cognitively costly, since it would require 
additional memory searches and generative procedures. Updating, in other words, can be a 
bad thing. Sometimes, prediction errors ought to be discounted as noise. 
Modeling character traits is no different. One might have a fairly accurate representation of a 
person’s character, and still occasionally be surprised by their behavior. For instance, one 
might be quite surprised to learn that Adolf Hitler was a vegetarian. Such information could 
be used to update one’s model of his moral character, but this seems unlikely. Rather, one 
would simply ignore this information, and continue to rely on one’s prior model. But this 
raises an interesting question: when do we update our character models in the face of new, 
conflicting behavioral information, and when do we treat it as noise? 																																																								9 Members of “collectivist” cultures, who habitually attend to contextual factors, no doubt benefit from such 
attentional effects in their comparative resistance to the correspondence bias. 
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A recent study by Daniel Ames and Susan Fiske hints at an answer (D. L. Ames and Fiske 
2013). Given that updating character models is likely to require the use of additional, limited 
cognitive resources, they hypothesized that people should selectively allocate those resources 
towards targets that are most behaviorally relevant to them. To test this hypothesis, they first 
introduced subjects to two confederates, who were described as “expert consultants” with 
whom the participants would later collaborate with in a joint project after first performing a 
solo task. Participants in the outcome-dependent condition were told that based on their 
performance in this joint task, they would be considered for a $50 prize. Participants in the 
outcome-independent condition, in contrast, were told that their eligibility for the prize 
would be based on their performance in the solo task only. Subjects then underwent fMRI 
scanning and were shown statements about the two confederates that were either consistent 
or inconsistent with what they had previously been told about them.  
Ames and Fiske found inverse patterns of activity in the dmPFC for the two conditions: 
participants in the outcome-dependent condition displayed more responsivity to inconsistent 
information, whereas participants in the outcome-independent condition showed more 
responsivity to the consistent information. The authors suggest that the outcome-
dependency manipulation led participants to use different updating strategies: when 
achieving their goal (the reward) depended upon interacting with the confederate, they used 
the inconsistent information to update their character model, so as to better predict and 
adjust to their partner’s behavior. In the outcome-independent condition, in contrast, 
participants tended to dismiss the inconsistent information as noise, and thus conserve 
cognitive resources.  
From a HPC perspective, we can interpret this outcome-dependent updating as reflecting 
higher-order predictions about the action-relevance of a prediction error. When surprising 
information is particularly important for action planning (e.g. when we expect to interact 
with a person in the future), we are more likely to incorporate that information into our 
predictive models, instead of dismissing it as noise. On the other hand, when a bit of 
surprising information is not action-relevant (e.g. when we do not expect to interact with a 
person in the future), we are less likely to devote resources to updating our predictive 
models, and more likely to dismiss the prediction error as noise. In other words, when a 
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prediction error is more relevant to our goals, we "raise the volume" on that signal; when it 
is less relevant, we "turn the volume down." In neuro-cognitive terms, this modulation of 
expected precision translates into shifts in attention. This may explain why participants 
under cognitive load are more likely to fall prey to the fundamental attribution error: when 
their attention is directed towards another task, they fail to attend to update their character 
models in response to error signals coming from situational information. 
In sum: temporally stable character traits are represented at the upper level of an action-
prediction hierarchy, and are used to generate prior probability distributions for hypotheses 
about more transient mental states, including beliefs and desires. These hypotheses are then 
used to inform hypotheses about even more transient states, which are in turn used to 
predict or interpret behavior. The downstream effects of trait-attributions on action-
prediction are liable to be modulated by active belief-attribution procedures operating at 
lower-levels in the hierarchy. Prediction-error signals are conveyed back up the hierarchy, 
and are either used to revise the model at the appropriate level, or dismissed as noise. The 
action-relevance of an input can modulate whether prediction errors are treated as noise or 
used to revise the model by changing the expected precision in of an input signal.  
6. Future directions 
Adopting an integrative hierarchical approach to reasoning about character traits enables us 
to make a number of novel predictions. Broadly speaking, we should expect that 
manipulating background information about a person's character should lead to differences 
in the kinds of mental states that we attribute to them, especially when interpreting 
ambiguous actions. More specifically, manipulating trait attributions along the warmth 
dimension should lead to either more negative or more positive desire and intention 
attributions. For instance, individuals presented as low-warmth should be interpreted as 
having harmful or self-serving desires, while individuals presented as high warmth should be 
interpreted as having helpful or altruistic ones (as we saw in section 2, this kind of effect is 
likely to be responsible for the side-effect effect (Sripada and Konrath 2011; Sripada 2012)). 
Manipulations along the competence dimension should lead to differences in the amount of 
knowledge that we attribute to them: more competent individuals should be more likely to 
be viewed as having the appropriate beliefs and making the appropriate inferences, while less 
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competent individuals should be more likely to be viewed as ignorant. Warmth and 
competence information could be conveyed through facial information, through the 
observation of diagnostic behaviors, interactive experiences, or through testimony.  
Beyond these initial predictions, this account of character-trait attribution offers us a new 
way to connect the study of mindreading with our understanding of stereotyping, prejudice 
and implicit bias (Spaulding 2016). As was noted earlier, the contents of common 
stereotypes are characterized by variation along the same two dimensions as ordinary trait 
attributions, suggesting that we use cues of group membership to infer that an individual will 
possess a particular set of character traits (e.g. an elderly person will be viewed as kind, but 
also as incompetent). Cues to group membership, such as skin color or accent, thus seem to 
play a similar role as facial features in conveying trait information; however, stereotypes seem 
to contain clusters of trait information, rather than just single traits. If trait attribution affects 
mental-state attribution as I’ve described, and stereotypes allow us to attribute clusters of 
character traits to individuals, then it would follow that stereotypes should also affect 
mental-state attribution.  
As it happens, there is already some evidence that this is the case. Sagar and Schofield 
showed sixth-grade children vignettes depicting ambiguously aggressive dyadic interactions 
between students, such as one student bumping into another in a hallway, asking for food in 
the cafeteria, poking another student, and taking a pencil without asking. The authors also 
systematically manipulated the race of the actor in each dyad, such that some participants 
saw a white actors bumping, asking for food, poking, etc., while others saw black actors 
doing so. They found that the behaviors of black actors were interpreted as more mean and 
threatening than the identical behaviors from white actors (Sagar and Schofield 1980). Thus, 
when the intention underlying an action is ambiguous (e.g. intentionally threatening and 
aggressive versus neutral), observers fell back on stereotypes about black aggressiveness to 
interpret it. These results suggest that ascertaining the role of character-trait attribution in 
mindreading may also help us to better understand the cognitive basis for implicit racism. 
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The connection with stereotyping also raises the possibility that, in addition to their role in 
action-prediction, trait attributions may also serve a social function.10 One of the 
explanations that has been offered for why we represent traits along the 
warmth/competence dimensions is that warmth helps us to keep track of potential threats, 
while competence helps us to keep track of agents’ social status (Fiske et al. 2007). Notably, 
threat and status are not intrinsic properties of individuals, but rather relational, social 
properties that tend to vary with context: who counts as threatening or high status often 
depends upon one’s own group identity and social rank. Thus, while we tend to represent 
traits as intrinsic, stable properties of individuals, it may be that what we are really tracking 
are social relationships.11 These factors will still be highly relevant to action-prediction, 
however: whether an individual is higher or lower-status than us, or a member of the in-
group or out-group, will have a significant effect on how they decide to act towards us. This 
may explain the predictive utility of trait-attributions: even if the situationists are right, and 
stable character traits do not really exist, we can still use trait representations as a proxy to 
help us factor social identity into our action-predictions. 
7. Conclusion 
Integrating character-trait attribution into a hierarchical Bayesian account of theory of mind 
promises to enrich our understanding, not just of these two sets of phenomena, but also a 
network of related phenomena of substantial social and philosophical importance. 
Traditional accounts of mindreading have paid little heed to character-trait attribution, 
focusing instead on the attribution of beliefs and desires. Folk psychology pluralists have 
rightly pointed this oversight, and taken important steps towards drawing attention to the 
significance of trait reasoning in folk-psychological inference. However, the pluralist account 
treated trait reasoning as a completely independent form of behavioral prediction, which 
does not fit well with the empirical data. In contrast, I have argued that the attribution of 
character traits is systematically related to the attribution of other forms of mentality, and 
that a hierarchical Bayesian architecture is a promising way to explain that relation. This 																																																								
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this. 
11 This may be an instance of what Cimpian and Salomon call the ‘inherence heuristic’ – a “fast, intuitive 
heuristic leads people to explain many observed patterns in terms of the inherent features of the things that 
instantiate these patterns” (Cimpian and Salomon 2014, p. 461) – and a precursor to psychological essentialism 
about certain social categories (Gelman 2004; Haslam et al. 2006; Rhodes et al. 2012). 
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account yields a number of novel empirical predictions about mindreading, and also has the 
potential to further unify the study of mindreading with neighboring empirical domains, 
such as stereotyping and implicit bias. 
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